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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 920614-CA 
v. : Priority No. 15 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, : 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff State of Utah appeals a trial court's final 
order of dismissal in a prosecution for carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-504(1)(b) (1990), unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(iii) and -(2)(d) 
(1990), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine), a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) and -(2)(d) (1990). The dismissal order was 
entered upon defendant's motion, following the trial court's 
grant of his motion to suppress evidence supporting the charges. 
The proceedings were held in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court, in and for Emery County, Utah, the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell, presiding. This State's appeal is taken pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1992); this Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A single issue is presented: Did the trial court 
erroneously conclude that defendant's detention by a police 
officer was not supported by reasonable suspicion/ and was 
therefore constitutionally invalid at its inception? Trial court 
rulings on reasonable suspicion to make an "investigative 
detention" are not reversed on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Svkes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36 (main opinion), 43 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (Utah App. Oct. 19, 1992). Accord 
State v. Rochell, No. 920309-CA, slip op. at 7-10 (Bench, J., 
concurring) (Utah App. April 1, 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990), provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
2 
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Any other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent 
to the resolution of the issue on appeal are set forth as 
necessary in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Wayne D. Potter was charged with unlawful 
possession of a concealed weapon, and with two counts of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance. The physical evidence 
supporting those charges consists of a pistol, and quantities of 
marijuana and cocaine that were seized upon defendant's detention 
by a police officer. 
Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence. At a 
hearing on the motion, the detaining officer testified. 
Additionally, at the parties' stipulation, the trial court 
considered testimony taken in a companion case, State v. Devon 
Bovd Potter, involving the entry and search of the trailer home 
occupied by defendant's brother, at about the same time that 
defendant was stopped (R. 99). The entry and search of Devon 
Potter's home are the subject of another appeal now pending in 
this Court, No. 920579-CA. 
After the hearing, the trial court granted defendant's 
motion in a written "Ruling on Motion to Suppress" (R. 78). Upon 
the State's motion to reconsider that ruling, the court 
reaffirmed itself in a written "Ruling on Motion to Reconsider" 
(R. 96). The court then issued written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and an Order on Motion to Suppress (R. 99-
106). Subsequently, on defendant's motion, the prosecution was 
3 
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dismissed and the State filed a notice of appeal from the 
dismissal (R. 107-114; all rulings are copied in the Appendix to 
this brief). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's fact recitation tracks the trial court's 
findings of fact, (R. 99-102), as supported by testimony taken 
during the hearing of defendant's motion to suppress (R. 212-65). 
This fact recitation is also supplemented by testimony in the 
hearing of Devon Potter's motion to suppress (R. 123-211). * 
Seizure of the Evidence 
Defendant Wayne Potter's problems began late one 
evening, when an officer stopped Mr. Leon Sandstrom for driving 
under the influence, near Devon Potter's home. Quite 
spontaneously (and hoping for favorable treatment in his pending 
D.U.I, prosecution), the intoxicated Sandstrom pointed to Devon's 
home, which he had recently left, and blurted out that several 
men were smoking marijuana inside it (R. 100, 127-32). 
A narcotics detective was therefore summoned (R. 133-
34). To the detective, Sandstrom claimed that the occupants of 
Devon's home were rolling marijuana "joints" from "a bag of 
marijuana three fingers deep." Based upon the information from 
Sandstrom, plus other information from an already-pending 
investigation, the detective and the local county attorney began 
a search warrant application for Devon Potter's home (R. 169-70). 
2As in the trial court, the parties have stipulated to the 
supplementation of the appellate record with the Devon Potter 
hearing transcript (R. 120). 
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The detective told several officers to watch Devon's 
home pending issuance of the search warrant (R. 166-67). During 
this surveillance, officers saw persons within the home peering 
out through its window and door several times, apparently alerted 
by Sandstrom's nearby arrest (R. 136, 189-90). One officer saw a 
white Nissan drive to Devon's home. A person exited the Nissan, 
walked to the home, remained only briefly ("about two or three 
minutes"), and then drove away (R. 100, 141, 148, 218, 230). 
The officers radioed their observations to the 
narcotics detective, who directed them to enter Devon Potter's 
home, and to secure it pending arrival of the search warrant.2 
He also directed them to detain and secure the departing white 
Nissan (R. 155-56). This latter task was assigned to an 
:>ting highway patrolman, Trooper Horrocks (R. 101, 156). 
Upon stopping the Nissan, Horrocks immediately 
recognized the driver, defer ~ it Wayne Potter. Horrocks had 
known defendant for several years, and knew that he had been 
previously arrested for illegal drug possession (R. 219-20). 
Horrocks believed defendant to be dangerous, based upon "common 
knowledge among the law enforcement community" that defendant 
carried a hidden weapon. Trooper Horrocks also knew one of 
defendant's three passengers, a Jimmy Lee, as someone he had 
arrested twice before. Horrocks knew that Lee "has a short 
temper and he's very—he was very easy to aggravate into a 
2The propriety of this home entry is at issue in the State's 
appeal in the Devon Potter case. State v. Devon Boyd Potter, No. 
920579-CA, Br. of Appellant at 10-14. 
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confrontation," Horrocks had previously had a physical 
confrontation with Lee (R. 101, 222-23). 
Concerned for his safety, Trooper Horrocks asked 
defendant and his passengers whether they had any weapons. He 
then directed them to exit the Nissan and to empty their pockets 
on its trunk. Horrocks explained that he used this approach, 
rather than individual frisks, in order to better observe all the 
detainees at once: "To frisk them individually, you have to 
concentrate on the individual which you're frisking, and you lose 
contact or observation of the other individuals there." . . . 
"If you can't see them, you can't protect yourself against 
movement that they do, or an attack" (R. 101, 223-25). 
Defendant did not fully comply with Horrocks's 
directions. After partially complying, defendant behaved 
evasively; according to Horrocks, he "wouldn't make eye contact 
with me, and he tried to avoid standing next to me, and he tried 
to hide behind Jimmy [Lee]." Horrocks then told defendant that 
"I didn't want him messing around with me, if he had something in 
his pockets, I wanted it out on the car." In response, defendant 
removed a pistol from his rear pocket, and placed it on the 
Nissan's trunk (R. 101, 225). 
Horrocks arrested defendant for unlawful possession of 
a concealed weapon. Positioning defendant between himself and 
the Nissan's passengers, Horrocks then searched defendant 
incident to the arrest (R. 102, 228-29, 232-33). From 
defendant's pocket, Horrocks retrieved "[a] small plastic bag 
6 
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containing a green leafy material that appeared to be marijuana . 
. .." He also retrieved a small Tupperware-type container, 
placed by defendant on the Nissan's trunk, that held a white 
powder residue (R. 102, 226-27). The pistol, leafy material, and 
white powder (apparently cocaine) comprised the physical evidence 
supporting the charges against defendant (R. 3-4). 
Trial Court Disposition 
The trial court determined that "[i]f there was 
reasonable cause to believe that illegal activity was going on 
inside [Devon Potter's home], there was [sic] no articulable 
facts connecting the Defendant with such activity other than his 
brief appearance on the premises" (R. 102). Therefore, the court 
ruled that defendant's initial detention was unconstitutional 
because "nothing" supported "reasonable suspicion of illegal 
conduct upon the part of the Defendant" (id..)* T^e court also 
stated that "[t]here was a seizure of Defendant when he was 
detained by Officer Horrocks in that Defendant was technically 
under arrest since he was not free to leave" (R. 103). 
The court held that "Officer Horrocks had good cause to 
search the Defendant after the Defendant was stopped" (R. 103). 
However, based upon its ruling that the detention was invalid at 
its inception, the court ordered suppression of the evidence 
seized from defendant (R. 103). The State challenges the ruling, 
underpinning the trial court's ultimate order of dismissal, that 
the detention of defendant by Trooper Horrocks was invalid at its 
inception. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's ruling that the initial detention was 
unsupported by reasonable suspicion was clearly erroneous, 
because it was induced by an erroneous view of the law. The 
court erroneously overstated the degree of proof necessary to 
show "reasonable suspicion" for a nonarrest detention. That 
error, apparent on the face of the trial court's ruling, equated 
reasonable suspicion with the higher degree of proof required for 
probable cause. 
This Court should reaffirm that the degree of proof 
needed for reasonable suspicion is less than that for probable 
cause. It can then remand this case to the trial court for re-
analysis under the correct, "minimal objective justification" 
standard. Alternatively, this Court may examine the established 
facts independently, and hold that based upon those facts, 
defendant's initial detention by Trooper Horrocks was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY EQUATED 
REASONABLE SUSPICION WITH PROBABLE CAUSE, ITS 
"NO REASONABLE SUSPICION" RULING WAS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
A trial court's ruling on the existence of reasonable 
suspicion to make an investigatory detention is reversed on 
appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Svkes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 
36 (main opinion), 43 (Jackson, J., concurring) (Utah App. Oct. 
19, 1992). A ruling is clearly erroneous if it is "without 
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of 
8 
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the law." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 
(1971), with respect to factual findings). The trial court's "no 
reasonable suspicion" ruling in this case was induced by an 
erroneous view of the law—a view that overstated the degree of 
proof needed for reasonable suspicion* 
A. The Degree of Proof Needed for Reasonable 
Suspicion is Less than that Needed for 
Probable Cause, 
The trial court's ruling that "[d]efendant was 
technically under arrest since he was not free to leave" when 
stopped (emphasis added) reveals a fundamental misperception of 
the nature of defendant's initial detention by Trooper Horrocks. 
This misperception appears on the face of both the trial court's 
final conclusions of law and its earlier ruling denying the 
State's motion to reconsider. In that ruling, the court stated: 
"No matter how you consider the facts in this case, they do not 
establish reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant was 
committing any crime or had committed a public offense at this 
time and place that would justify his apprehension and detention" 
(R. 97, emphasis added). 
While defendant was not free to leave at the moment 
when Horrocks stopped him, he was not "under arrest" either. 
Instead, as found by the trial court, and established by 
uncontested testimony, defendant was stopped in order to "secure" 
him and his vehicle, pending issuance of a warrant to search his 
brother's home (R. 101, 155-56, 219). Therefore, defendant's 
9 
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encounter with Trooper Horrocks began as a temporary detention, 
not an arrest or "apprehension,"3 
By mischaracterizing the initial detention as an 
arrest, the trial court directed itself to the wrong provision of 
the Utah Code, governing warrantless arrests, rather than 
temporary detentions. The arrest provision, Utah Code Ann. § 77-
7-2 (1990), requires probable or "reasonable cause"—the same 
term used by the trial court—for full custodial arrests. The 
trial court should have analyzed the detention under the less-
strict "reasonable suspicion" standard of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
15 (1990), which codifies the "investigatory detention" principle 
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). 
The trial court so erred even though the prosecutor, 
during argument of the motion to suppress, directed it to State 
v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) (R. 234). In Bruce, the Utah 
Supreme Court considered facts similar to this case: A robbery 
witness saw the robber disappear, on foot, into a housing 
complex. Moments later, the witness saw an orange car exit the 
complex, but could not see its occupants. Police were notified, 
and broadcast a description of the orange car; an officer who 
overheard the broadcast saw the car, and stopped it. Bruce, a 
passenger in the car, was then identified as the robber and 
arrested. 779 P.2d at 648. On appeal, the supreme court readily 
3See State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 365-66, 10 P.2d 1073, 
1075-76 (1932) (absent "actual restraint" and officer intent to 
take person into custody, there is no arrest; construing statutes 
now found at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1990)). 
10 
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upheld the initial stop, even though the police broadcast had 
added unverified information that the orange car was occupied by 
two black males. Even absent the information about the black 
males, the court held, the stop was supported by reasonable 
suspicion, and was therefore proper. Ld. at 650-51. 
Significantly, the defendant in Bruce had argued that 
his initial detention was unsupported by probable cause. 77 9 
P.2d at 650. The supreme court, however, relying upon Terry and 
its own post-Terry caselaw—and, by implication, section 77-7-15, 
upheld the stop on the less strict, reasonable suspicion 
standard: "We have held that a brief investigatory stop of an 
individual by police officers is permissible when the officers 
have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity." Bruce, 119 P.2d at 
650 (quoting authorities; internal quotations omitted)/ 
Shortly before Bruce was issued, the United States 
Supreme Court reiterated that the degree of proof for reasonable 
suspicion is less than that required for probable cause: 
The officer, of course, must be able to 
articulate something more than an inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch." 
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal 
*In its original ruling granting the motion to suppress, the 
trial court cited Bruce, correctly stating that in a reasonable 
suspicion-based detention, an officer "can only stop the vehicle 
[or subject] briefly while attempting to obtain further information 
regarding those suspicions" (R. 82). The court may have then felt 
that Horrocks's stop of defendant, proper at its inception, 
exceeded its legitimate scope. However, in its final findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court squarely ruled that 
the stop, once effected, was legitimate in scope; it ruled the stop 
improper at its inception (R. 103). 
11 
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level of objective justification" for making 
the stop* That level of suspicion is 
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by 
a preponderance of the evidence. We have 
held that probable cause means "a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found," and the level of 
suspicion required for a Terry stop is 
obviously less demanding than probable cause 
• • • • 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 
(1989) (citations and some quotations omitted). Accord Terry, 
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. 
In the wake of Sokolow, this Court also recognized that 
reasonable suspicion requires less certainty than probable cause, 
by stating, in State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 
1990), that reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective 
facts suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal 
activity" (emphasis added). This comports with the fourth 
amendment's "minimal objective justification" standard for 
reasonable suspicion, set forth in Sokolow.5 
The Menke-Sokolow definition of reasonable suspicion 
recognizes that limited, non-arrest detentions serve not merely 
to apprehend criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and prevent 
criminal activity. E.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 
1880 (limited detentions supported by interest in "effective 
5A1though the Utah Constitution's search and seizure 
provision, Article I, section 14, was mentioned in defendant's 
motion to suppress and in the trial court's rulings granting the 
motion (R. 75, 102), that provision was not alleged to provide 
greater protection than the fourth amendment. Accordingly, this 
appeal proceeds under a fourth amendment analysis. See State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah App. 1990). 
12 
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crime prevention and detection"); accord Svkes, 198 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 45 n.l (Bench, P.J., dissenting). That definition 
contemplates a very real likelihood that many such detentions 
will reveal no criminal evidence. That likelihood, however, does 
not erode the validity of acting upon facts that, at the moment 
in question, would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in 
taking action. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. 
In sum, the trial court applied the wrong legal 
standard to its analysis of defendant's detention by Trooper 
Horrocks. Put differently, the court analyzed the detention 
within the wrong legal "field of inquiry." See State v. 
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 521-23 (Utah App. 1992) (Bench, P.J., 
concurring). By inquiring into probable cause to arrest, rather 
than "minimal objective justification" to effect an investigatory 
detention, the trial court committed clear error in ruling that 
the detention was improper at its inception. 
B. Analyzed under the Correct "Minimal Objective 
Justification" Degree of Proof, the Initial 
Detention Was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion, 
and Was therefore Proper. 
This Court may appropriately remand this case to the 
trial court, with instructions to re-analyze the propriety of 
defendant's initial detention under the legally correct degree of 
proof. However, the underlying "historical facts" surrounding 
this detention, c£. State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah 
App. 1991), appear settled, so far as the State is concerned. 
Therefore, this Court may choose to decide the detention's 
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propriety itself, under the "minimal objective justification" 
standard for reasonable suspicion. 
In applying the foregoing fourth amendment standard, 
the State confines its analysis to the initial detention of this 
defendant. The State notes that questions regarding the "scope" 
of a detention, once properly initiated, involve a similar 
analysis. Recognizing the value of more concise briefing, 
however, the State will, in arguing that defendant's detention 
was supported by minimal objective justification, compare this 
case only to other cases that analyze initial detentions. 
The following established facts constituted the 
necessary minimal objective justification for this detention: 
The spontaneous statements of the intoxicated driver, Sandstrom, 
prompted surveillance of Devon Potter's home, and the application 
for a warrant to search that home. During ongoing surveillance, 
pending arrival of the warrant, the home's occupants repeatedly 
peered outside, appearing to be concerned about the nearby police 
presence. Defendant then drove to the home, remained there only 
briefly, and departed. 
There may have been wholly innocent explanations, and 
alternative inferences, to be gleaned from every one of the 
foregoing facts. This, however, has never been a proper basis 
for ruling that an investigative detention was invalid: 
We said in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 
S. Ct. 2752, [] (1980) (per curiam), "there 
could, of course, be circumstances in which 
wholly lawful conduct might justify the 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." 
. . . Indeed, Terry rv* Ohio! itself involved 
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"a series of acts, each of them perhaps 
innocent" if viewed separately, "but which 
taken together warranted further 
investigation." 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S. Ct., 
at 1881. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87. Accordingly, 
in Menke, this Court correctly held that the behavior of an 
individual outside a shopping mall, "although conceivably 
consistent with innocent—albeit highly eccentric—activity," 
were nevertheless also consistent with shoplifting. 787 P.2d at 
541. Therefore, the detention of that individual by observing 
law officers was deemed reasonable. Id. 
In this case, the trial court concluded that there were 
"no articulable facts" connecting defendant with possible illegal 
activity inside Devon Potter's home "other than his brief 
appearance on the premises" (R. 102). Certainly defendant could 
not be convicted of wrongdoing based upon this fact alone; 
certainly this fact alone could not support probable cause to 
arrest or search him. However, it is equally clear that under 
the "minimal objective justification" standard, there was 
reasonable suspicion to detain defendant. 
Defendant's "brief appearance" at Devon Potter's home 
cannot be viewed in isolation, as the trial court apparently did 
here. Instead, the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). 
The circumstances surrounding defendant's appearance at 
the home included a chain of unusual events and "eccentric" 
behavior. The home's occupants, at least reasonably suspected of 
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possessing illicit drugs, showed great interest in the nearby 
police presence. It was reasonable to infer that, worried about 
a possible police investigation into their activities, the home's 
occupants might summon a friend to remove any incriminating 
evidence from the premises.6 Defendant's brief visit, even 
though consistent with innocent behavior, was also consistent 
with this inference. There was, therefore, a minimal objective 
justification, and therefore reasonable suspicion, to allow 
Trooper Horrocks to detain defendant. 
To be sure, there are cases wherein Utah appellate 
courts have condemned investigatory detentions based upon the 
detainees' mere presence near a crime scene, or mere proximity to 
other persons suspected of criminal behavior. See, e.g., State 
v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (driving slowly 
through neighborhood that had experienced a "rash of burglaries" 
did not justify detention); State v. Swaniaan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1985) (per curiam) (walking in neighborhood of home burglarized 
several hours earlier did not justify detention); State v. Svkes, 
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. Oct. 19, 1992) (defendant who 
left premises under general surveillance for suspected drug 
6In the trial court, the State made oral argument and filed a 
memorandum, arguing along the lines set forth in this brief (R. 92-
95, 234-36, 254-57). The State specifically referred to "the 
lesser burden of establishing reasonable suspicion" (R. 94-95). 
The concealment of criminal evidence constitutes one form of 
the offense of obstructing justice, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 
(Supp. 1992), and may also constitute tampering with evidence, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1990). While not articulated by the State in 
the trial court, such loss of evidence was clearly a concern 
underlying this detention, and brought this detention within 
section 77-7-15's required suspicion of a "public offense." 
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activity was improperly detained); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 
(Utah App. 1991) (woman was improperly detained as she approached 
a truck wherein suspicious behavior was observed), cert, denied, 
843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah 
App, 1991) (defendant was improperly detained while apparently 
approaching, but before reaching, premises that were being 
searched pursuant to warrant); State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85 
(Utah App. 1987) (defendant walking in area of recent "car 
prowls" was improperly detained; unclear whether detention began 
with initial encounter or when officer actually frisked 
defendant). Of those cases issued after the United States 
Supreme Court's Sokolow decision, however, not one cites the 
correct "minimal objective justification" standard for reasonable 
suspicion-based detentions. 
Of the foregoing cases, the facts in Steward and Svkes 
most closely resemble the facts in this case. Although neither 
case cited the minimal objective justification standard, both 
appear to have been correctly decided under it. Both cases, like 
this one, involved stops of individuals near "suspect premises." 
Nevertheless, each is distinctive from this case in a key 
circumstance: In Steward, the defendant was stopped before even 
reaching the premises, which were then being searched pursuant to 
a warrant. The Court aptly observed that when the officers first 
effected the detention, they could not distinguish the defendant 
from any innocent person who might have been driving past on the 
public street. 806 P.2d at 216. In Svkes, no warrant had yet 
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been sought for the suspect premises; only preliminary 
surveillance was under way. Still lacking "positive evidence 
linking the house to illegal activity," an officer stopped 
defendant Sykes after she briefly visited it. This, the Court 
held, was improper. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37-38. 
Here, in contrast, defendant actually made contact with 
the occupants of Devon Potter's home, remaining there a short 
time—but long enough to retrieve the "bag of marijuana" said, by 
Sandstrom, to be present therein. Further, the home was no 
longer under preliminary surveillance. Instead, as a result of 
Sandstrom's report and other evidence tending to show probable 
cause, a search warrant application was then in progress. The 
surveilling officers had a legitimate interest in preventing the 
evidence that they hoped to find in the home from being spirited 
away before the warrant arrived. Defendant's appearance at the 
home, as they awaited the warrant, created minimally objective 
justification, or reasonable suspicion, to act against such an 
untoward possibility. 
Once again, it was the possibility of evidence loss, 
not the certainty, and the objective facts tending to heighten 
that possibility, that justified this detention. The detention 
may have proven that the possibility had not been realized. In 
fact, this case can be approached as though it turned out that 
Officer Horrocks had stopped an entirely innocent individual— 
perhaps a door-to-door salesperson, or somebody merely stopping 
to ask directions. This, however, would not undercut the 
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validity of the detention, under the correct "minimal objective 
justification" standard for reasonable suspicion. 
The trial court's condemnation of this detention is 
also troubling from a policy perspective. This was no instance 
of unbridled, arbitrary police action. Rather, the involved 
officers acted with appropriate restraint, watching Devon 
Potter's home while awaiting a warrant, rather than immediately 
barging in on the strength of Sandstrom's allegations alone. 
When they became concerned that the brief visit to the home by 
the white Nissan represented a threat to their wish to perform a 
successful search, they did not immediately pounce on the 
vehicle. Rather, they consulted with one another—and apparently 
with the county attorney as well, before deciding to detain it. 
Simply put, this is not the kind of police behavior that should 
be deterred through the harsh remedy of suppression. Instead, 
such self-restrained behavior should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in 
ruling that the detention of defendant was, at its outset, 
unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, that ruling 
was clearly erroneous, and this Court should reverse it. This 
Court may then either remand this case, instructing the trial 
court to re-analyze the detention under the correct standard, or 
apply that standard itself and hold that the initial detention 
was proper. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 0>° day of April, 1993 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to MARK T. ETHINGTON, DAY & BARNEY, Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellee, 45 East Vine Street, Murray, Utah 84107, this CX? day 
of April, 1993. 
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APPENDIX 
Trial Court Rulings and Orders 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D«TR:CT COURT 
O F l / T ^ " - 1 -• ••• • - • • • O T Y 
APR 13 1992 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, j 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, 
Defendant. 
I RULING ON MOTION TO 
) SUPPRESS 
i Criminal No. 1029 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence in 
this case came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 
1992. The attorneys were present and the Court heard 
testimony of Trooper Jeff Horrocks and, purusant to 
stipulation of the parties, considered the testimony of 
Officers of the Emery County Sheriff's Department by way of a 
transcript of hearing held on September 16, 1991, on a motion 
to suppress in the case of State v Devon Boyd Potter where 
the incidents leading up to the stop of the Defendant's 
vehicle were covered. 
The Court finds that Officer Horrocks had good cause 
to search the Defendant after he stopped him in his vehicle. 
Although the officer did not know who was driving the vehicle 
until he approached it, he immediately recognized the 
defendant at that time and, by prior experience and general 
reputation, he knew that there may be some danger to himself 
if he carried out his intent to detain the Defendant without 
conducting a search for weapons. 
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The Officer stopped the vehicle with the intent to 
detain the occupants. Once this was done, the occupants were 
technically under arrest since they were not free to leave, 
and the officer has the right, under these circumstances, to 
search for weapons, which he did. In fact, he found a 
firearm concealed on the person of the Defendant in the 
search. 
The question the Court must consider, however, is 
the legality of the stop of the vehicle and the detention of 
the Defendant. If this was done in violation of Defendant's 
constitutional rights, it follows that the evidence recovered 
from the search incident to that detention cannot be used as 
evidence. 
There are several recent cases that have been 
considered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in 
Utah that analyze this question. They all conclude that 
"Thus, 'a stop can be justified only upon a showing of 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime, 
or that he was stopped incident to a traffic offense'11. 
(State v. Roth, 181 UAR 25) 
2 
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In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion 
inquiry, it must be determined if, from the facts apparent to 
Officer Horrocks, and the reasonable inference drawn there-
from, that he would reasonably suspect that the Defendant was 
committing, or had committed, a crime prior to the stop. 
This suspicion must be based upon articulated objective facts 
then apparent to the officer. 
Officer Horrocks had a right to rely on the 
information given to him by other officers as a basis to 
support his reasonable suspicion, but only if the basis for 
the matters relayed were also based upon articulated facts* 
Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the trailer 
home that they were observing from about one-half block away 
was under surveilance while a search warrant was being 
secured. He further informed him that an informant, who had 
just previously been arrested for drunk driving, had told the 
officers that there was a pot party going on in the trailer 
and that marijuana was present. 
Horrocks further stated that while observing the 
trailer he saw a person get out a car near the trailer, go 
to the trailer, and then go to the car, get into the car and 
begin to drive away. At that point, Officer Mangum 
instructed Officer Horrocks to stop the car and to detain the 
occupants pending the arrival of the search warrant. 
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Officer Horrocks followed these instructions and 
stopped the vehicle with the intent to detain its occupants 
pending the arrival of the search warrant, or pending further 
instructions. Without any other facts that would indicate 
any illegal activity on the part of the occupants of the car, 
the vehicle was stopped. 
The Defendant was not in the house trailer when the 
officers entered it to secure the premises pending the 
receipt of a search warrant, and he was not identified to 
them by the imformant as being in the trailer when the 
informant said he observed marijuana or that a pot party was 
in progress. 
If there was reasonable cause to believe that 
illegal activity was going on inside the trailer at that time, 
there were no articulatable facts connecting the Defendant 
with such activity other than his brief appearance on the 
premises. None of the officers knew who the occupants of the 
vehicle were until it was stopped by Officer Horrocks. Since 
they did not know that the Defendant personally was in the 
vehicle or that he personally was on the premises, the fact 
that they may have known that he was a convicted drug abuser 
is immaterial since this fact was not used by them 
informulating reasonable suspicion. 
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The attorney for the State in articulating facts 
states that Deputy Gayle Jensen personally observed defendant 
enter and exit the trailer. On review of Deputy Jensen's 
testimony (Transcript, page 32), he did not state that he saw 
the defendant enter and leave but only that he saw a little 
white car leave the trailer. 
There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or 
in what was conveyed to him that would create reasonable 
suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant. 
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the 
Emery County Sheriff's Office could facutally articulate that 
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant 
had committed or was committing a crime except his 
unidentified brief appearance on the premises as indicated. 
The Courts have consistently held that this fact 
alone is not enough to create reasonable suspicion. 
Even in cases where the officer has reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity based upon direction from a 
dispatch officer or from other police officers, and he stops 
a vehicle, he can only stop the vehicle briefly while 
attempting to obtain further information regarding those 
suspicions. (See State v Bruce. 779 P2d 646) 
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Office Horrocks stated that he stopped the vehicle 
to detain the occupants pending further instructions or, the 
Court assumes, until the arrival of the search warrant for 
the trailer, and that his purpose was not to investigate or 
to make further inquiry relative to any suspicions of illegal 
activity. 
For these reasons, THE COURT FINDS that the 
Defendant's constitutional rights were violated, and that the 
stop was not legally made, and that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
The Attorney for the Defendant is directed to make 
formal Findings of Fact and an Order granting the Motion to 
Suppress. ., 
DATED this ~Z ^ > day of April, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
DAY AND BARNEY 
Attorneys at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
Post Office Box 1099 
Castle Dale UT 84513 
DATED this Q ^ day of April, 1992. 
Secretary 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
STATE 
V. 
WAYNE 
OF UTAH 
DERRON 
1/ ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
POTTER, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Criminal No, 91-2660 
The State has filed a motion asking the Court to 
reconsider its previous ruling relative to the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress the Evidence gathered against him. 
In view of the fact that the Court missed the state-
ment by Deputy Jensen found on page 37 of the transcript of his 
testimony, THE COURT WILL grant the Motion and will reconsider 
its previous ruling. 
The statement of the Deputy contained at that page 
still leaves some doubt as to whether or not he recognized the 
Defendant at the time the Defendant left the trailer since his 
statement about seeing him leave came after he had talked to 
Officer Horrocks and the Defendant had been identified to him 
as the driver of the white car. No one whose testimony was 
used for the purpose of this hearing mentions the name of the 
Defendant at anytime prior to the stop and his identification 
being made known by Officer Horrocks. 
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The instructions to Officer Horrocks were to stop the white car 
and no mention was made relative to its occupants. 
However, for the sake of this ruling we will assume 
that the Deputy recognized the Defendant as the person who left 
the trailer ?.nd drove away in the white car. 
The i still remains that the Defendant was not in 
the trailer at the time the Officers entered, and he was not 
mentioned by the informant as being present at the alleged pot 
party. 
On the contrary, Officer Horrocks said he observed the 
driver of the white car get out of the car, go to the trailer 
and return to the car and drive away. 
No matter how you consider the facts in this case, 
they do not establish reasonable cause to believe that the 
Defendant was committing any crime or had committed a public 
offense at this time and place that would justify his 
apprehension and detention. 
FOR THESE REASONS, the Court affirms its prior ruling 
that the Motion to Suppress be granted. 
DATED this ^sSj^day of April, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
Attorney at Law 
DAY AND BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
P. 0. BOX 249 
Castle Dale UT 84013 
DATED this ^f/fLday of April, 1992 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, 
Defendant. ] 
l FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. 1029 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in 
this case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992. 
After hearing the testimony of Tropper Jeff Horrocks and 
pursuant to stipulation of the parties, considering the 
testimony of various officers of Emery County as set forth in a 
transcript of a suppression hearing in the case of State v. 
Devon Boyd Potter where the incidents leading up to the stop of 
Defendant's vehicle are set forth, the Court now makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the 
trailer home that they were observing from about one-half block 
away was under suerveillance while a search warrant was being 
secured. 
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2. Deputy Mangum further informed Officer Horrocks 
that an informant, who had previously been arrested for drunk 
driving, had told the officers that there was a pot party going 
on in the trailer and that marijuana was present. 
3. While observing the trailer, Officer Horrocks saw a 
person get out of a car near the trailer, go to the trailer and 
then come back to the car a short while later, get into the car 
and begin to drive away. 
4. Officer Gayle Jensen (the officer who stopped the 
DUI suspect) observed the same vehicle leave the trailer. 
5. The Defendant (who was subsequently discovered to 
be the driver of the vehicle) was not in the house trailer when 
the officers subsequently entered it to secure the premises 
pending receipt of a search warrant. 
6. The Defendant was not identified by the informant 
as being in the trailer when the informant said he observed 
marijuana or that a pot party was in progress. 
7. Deputy Jensen, who was on the premises being 
secured, recognized the Defendant as the person who was driving 
away in the car and knew that the Defendant had been previously 
convicted of a drug offense. 
-2-
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8. As the vehicle was leaving the trailer, Deputy 
Mangum, upon instruction from Deputy Jensen, requested Officer 
Horrocks to stop the vehicle and to detain the occupants pending 
arrival of the search warrant. 
9. Without any other facts that would indicate any 
illegal activity on the part of any of the occupants of the car, 
Officer Horrocks then stopped the vehicle with the intent to 
detain the occupants until either the search warrant arrived or 
until further instructions. Officer Horrocks' purpose was not 
to investigate or to make further inquiry relative to any 
suspicions or illegal activity. 
10. Although Officer Horrocks did not know who was 
driving the vehicle before the stop, upon approaching the 
vehicle he immediately recognized the Defendant as the driver of 
the vehicle, and, by prior experience and reputation, he knew 
that there may be some danger to himself if he carried out his 
intent to detain the Defendant without a search for weapons. 
11. Officer Horrocks then conducted a search of the 
occupants, including the Defendant, by having them empty their 
pockets. A concealed firearm was discovered on the person of 
the Defendant during the course of this search. 
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12, Officer Horrocks then arrested the Defendant for 
carrying a concealed weapon, and then searched the Defendant 
incident to this arrest, and during this search he discovered 
some marijuana and some pills and a small container containing 
what was later analyzed as cocaine residue. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. If there was reasonable cause to believe that 
illegal activity was going on inside the trailer, there was no 
articulable facts connecting the Defendant with such activity 
other than his brief appearance on the premises. 
2. There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or 
in what was conveyed to him that would create reasonable 
suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant. 
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the 
Emery County Sheriff's Office could factually articulate that 
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had 
committed or was committing a crime except his brief appearance 
on the premises. 
3. Because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop 
Defendant's vehicle for the purpose of detaining him, the 
Defendant's constitutional rights as set forth in the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 
Aarticle I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, and Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress should be granted. 
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4. There was a seizure of Defendant when he was 
detained by Officer Horrocks in that Defendant was technically 
under arrest since he was not free to leave. 
5. Officer Horrocks had good cause to search the 
Defendant after the Defendant was stopped. However, evidence 
discovered as a result of the search should be suppressed as a 
result of the prior illegal stop. 
DATED this / day of May, 1992. 
SO^BUpfeLL, Di'&tHct Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
DAY AND BARNEY 
Attorneys at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
Post Office Box 1099 
Castle Dale UT 84513 
DATED this f ** day of May, 1992 
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Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
F I L E D 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE DERRON POTTER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in this 
case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992. After 
hearing the testimony of Trooper Jeff Horrocks and, pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties, considering the testimony of various 
officers of Emery County as set forth in a transcript of a 
suppression hearing in the case of State v. Devon Boyd Potter where 
the incidents leading up to the stop of Defendant's vehicle are set 
forth, and pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered herewith, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress is granted, and any and all evidence seized from the 
Defendant as a result of the stop and subsequent search in question, 
including but not limited to, a Titan 25 Caliber semi automatic 
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pistol serial number D823944, small plastic tuperware container 
allegedly containing cocaine residue, any alleged cocaine residue, 
marijuana, twelve Tylenol 3 tablets, and various other pills, shall 
be suppressed and not be allowed to be used as evidence against the 
Defendant. 
Dated this / day of /^7-lB^f . 1992. 
Judcje Boyd Bunn 
^ 
<£2ZJ-
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DKTP.1CT COURT 
OF UTAH !N AMD POR EM^PY COUNTY 
JUN 191992 
bnuUfcC. FUNK-Clerk 
By . ^ ^ Deputy 
Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
WAYNE D. POTTER, : Case No. 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and hereby 
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss with prejudice the 
Information herein for the following reasons. On April 6, 1992, a 
hearing was held before this Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
all of the evidence seized from the Defendant at the time of his 
arrest in this matter. This Court took the matter under advisement 
at that time. On April 9, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling 
on Motion to Suppress wherein Defendant's motion was granted. On 
April 21, 1992, the State of Utah filed a Motion to Reconsider or for 
Rehearing. On April 28, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling on 
Motion to Reconsider wherein the State's motion was denied. On May 
7, 1992, this Court entered an Order on Motion to Suppress along with 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the Defendant's 
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Motion to Suppress was granted. A mailing certificate was attached 
to the Order indicating that a copy of the Order had been delivered 
to Patricia Geary, Emery County Attorney, 
At least thirty (30) days have now elapsed since the filing of 
the Court's Order granting the motion to suppress, and the State has 
not filed an interlocutory appeal. 
Because the State essentially can not make a prima facie case 
against the Defendant due to the granting of the motion to suppress, 
it would be fruitless and a waste of time and resources to proceed 
with a trial of this matter. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to 
continue to let the charges just sit without some type of action on 
them. This may constitute a violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial. 
Consequently, the Defendant respectfully requests that the 
Information herein be dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this day of June, 1992. 
Mark T. Ethingto 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney and 
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Dismiss, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249 
on this In day of June, 1992. 
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By 
MARK T. ETHINGTON (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
45 EAST VINE STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE: (801) 262-6800 
.. Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE D. POTTER, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
Civil No. 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court on the 18th 
day of June, 1992, by Mark T. Ethington, Attorney for Defendant, is 
now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. 
DATED and SIGNED this JZ. &aY o f August, 1992. 
7k*U T?jLpt 
Mark T. Ething^n Mark 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and 
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to 
Submit for Decision, postage pre-paid, to: 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249 
on this fO day of August, 1992. 
Cmvruju C/QA/soxm 
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INTHE SEVENTH. Ji»r:?C:^ D:*T^/CT COURT 
SEP _ 21992 
bfiuti: C. FUNK - Cieik 
By — N ~ V ^ V A-*^.> Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
WAYNE D. POTTER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. ] 
i RULING ON MOTION 
i TO DISMISS 
Criminal No. 1029 
The Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss this action 
on the ground that the Court granted a motion to suppress the 
evidence in this case on May 7, 1992, and that the State has not 
proceeded to obtain a trial date, and on the further ground that 
the State has indicated that they have no other evidence of 
criminal activity on the part of the Defendant as alleged in the 
Information in this case. 
The Plaintiff has filed no objection to the Motion• 
THE COURT HEREBY GRANTS the Motion and Orders that this 
case be dismissed, 
/ST 
DATED this / * day of September, 1992. 
Ill 
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IOAM 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true copy of the above 
entitled RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS by depositing the same in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark T. Ethington 
DAY AND BARNEY 
Attorneys at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray UT 84107 
Patricia Geary 
County Attorney for Emery County 
Post Office Box 249 
Castle Dale UT 84513 
Dated this /sc/^ day of September, 1992• 
Secretary 
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PILED 
Or UTAH !\< <vn t.-.p - . , - ! . ' f U c * ' *n7 
• -• - • - • —-v COUNT V 
SEP 18 1992 
By L V ^ 
uepuiy 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
WAYNE D. POTTER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Criminal No. 1029 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
The State of Utah appeals the trial court's final order 
of dismissal in the above-entitled case, entered September 1, 1992. 
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals, and is filed pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. SS 77-18a-l(2)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
DATED this '{p day of September, 1992j_ 
[iLj 
J. KfiVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
PATRICIA GEARY O \ J ^ 
Emery County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Mark T. Ethington, attorney for defendant/appellee, 45 East Vine 
Street, Murray, Utah 84107, this day of September, 1992. 
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